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D. E. Knuth (1976, "Mariages stables," Presses Univ. Montrral, Montreal) 
conjectured that any matching can be transformed to some stable matching by a 
sequence of b-interchanges. Given a matching M and a blocking pair (m, w) for M, 
a b-interchange for M by (m, w) is defined as a transformation from M to a match- 
ing obtained by replacing two pairs (m, pM(m)) and (pM(w), w) in M with (m, w) 
and (pM(w), pM(m)). In this paper, we give a counter-example in which some 
matching cannot be transformed to any stable matching by b-interchanges. 
However, any matching can be transformed to some stable matching by using 
b-interchanges and identifying special cycling. We also give an algorithm to find 
either such cycling or a stable matching. © 1993 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In an instance of the stable marriage problem of size n, each of n men 
and n women has a list of all members, called a preference list, of the 
opposite sex in the order of preference. Person p prefers q to r if and only 
if q precedes r on p's preference list, which we write as q <p r. If either q = r 
or q <p r then we write q ~<p r. A matching is a set of n disjoint couples of 
men and women. If man m and woman w are coupled in a matching M, 
then m and w are called partners in M, which we write as either 
m = pM(w), w = pM(m), or (m, w)~ M according to convenience. Man m 
and woman w are said to be a blocking pair for a matching M if 
w <m pM(m) and m <w pM(w). If there is no blocking pair for M then the 
matching M is called stable. For a given stable marriage instance of size n, 
the divorce digraph is defined as follows. The node set of this digraph is the 
set of n! matchings. The digraph has a directed edge from a matching M 
to a matching M'  if and only if there is a blocking pair (m, w) for M such 
that M'  is obtained from M by replacing (m, pM(m)) and (pM(w), w) with 
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(m, w) and (pM(w), p~(m)). We call such a replacement arising from a 
blocking pair (m, w) a b-interchange by (m, w), and we denote M' by 
binter(M, m, w). 
Gale and Shapley [1] proved that there exists at least one stable 
matching for any stable marriage instance. From the result, there is at least 
one sink in any divorce digraph. In a book of Knuth [-3] it is conjectured 
that there is a path from each node to a sink in the divorce digraph, in 
other words, any matching can be transformed to some stable matching 
by a sequence of b-interchanges ( ee also Gusfield and Irving [-2]). In 
Section 2, we provide a counter-example in which some matching cannot 
be transformed to any stable matching by b-interchanges. In fact if size 
n/> 4, one can always find such an instance. However, any matching can 
be transformed to some stable matching by using b-interchanges and 
identifying a special cycle in the divorce digraph. In Section 3, we give an 
algorithm to find either such a cycle or a stable matching. 
2. COUNTER-EXAMPLE 
Let {mo ..... m, 1} and {w 0 . . . . .  Wn 1} denote the sets of n men and n 
women. For each person p, l(p), 2(p) .... , n(p) denote the first, second ..... 
nth person on p's preference list, respectively. 
In order to deny Knuth's conjecture, we consider a stable marriage 
instance of size n >/4 in which for each man me and each woman wi, 
l(m,)=we, 2(mi)=wi_2, 
3(me)=wi+l, 4(rni)=we 1, 5(me),...:arbitrary, 
l(wi)=me+x, 2(wi)=mi_l, 
3(wi)=m i, 4(wi)=mi+2, 5(wi) .... :arbitrary 
(see Fig. 1). In this section indices i -2 ,  i -1 ,  i+ 1, i+ 2, etc., are taken 
modulo n. Let J (n )  denote such an instance of size n. We will prove that 
J (n )  is a counter-example for Knuth's conjecture. 
In the section we consider matchings M such that pM(mi)=k(me) for 
some k = 1, 2, 3, 4, for each man mi. Let shift(M) denote the set of n 
couples in which mi+ l's partner is wj+ 1 if pM(mi) = w s for i = 0, 1, ..., n - 1. 
Obviously shift(M) is a matching, i.e., (m~+ 1, Wj+x)sshift(M) if and only 
if (m~, wj)eM. From the definition of J (n) ,  the matching shift(M) is 
obtained from M by cyclically shifting women among men on men's lists, 
i.e., shift(M) is equal to the matching in which me+l's partner is k(m~+ 1)
if pM(me)=k(m~) for i=0,  1 ..... n--1 (see Figs. 2 and 3). In the figures, 
the underlined person in each person's list is his or her partner in the 
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ml  
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ran -1  
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: : : : 
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Women's Preference Lists 
W0 
Wl 
Wn-3 
Wn-2  
Wn- -1  
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: : : : 
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mo mn-  2 rl~n--1 ~711 
FIG. 1. Stable marr iage instance J (n ) .  
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mn-2  
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Wn-4  Wn- -6  Wn-3  Wn-5  • . . 
Wn- -3  Wn- -5  Wn- -2  Wn-  4 • . . 
Wn- -2  Wn- -4  Wn- -1  Wn-3  • . . 
Wn-  1 Wn-  3 WO Wn- -  2 " " " 
Women's  P re ference  L is ts  
Wo 
Wl 
Wn-4  
Wn- -3  
Wn- -2  
Wn- -1  
ml  mn-1  m...~o m 2 
m2 mo m.... k m 3 
: : : : 
ran -3  ~2n-5  ran-4  ran -2  
mn-2  ran_  4 ran_3  mn_ l  
mn-1  ran-3  mn-  2 mo 
mo mn_2  mn_ l  ml  
FIG. 2. M= {(mo, Wo) ..... (m,_ l ,  w, 2)}. 
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Wo 
Wl 
wn_4 
Wn-3  
Wn-2  
Wn-1  
ml ~?m-1 mo m2 
m2 mo m..L m3 
: : : : 
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ran-1  ran -3  772n- 2 m 0 
m..~o mn-2  ran-1  ml  
FIG. 3. sh i f t (M)  = {(mo, wn_l )  ..... (m, 1, Wo)}. 
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corresponding matchings. The matching shift(M) is also equivalent to the 
matching obtained from M by cyclically shifting men among women on 
women's lists, in which wi+l's partner is k(wi+l) if p~i(wi)=k(wi) for 
i = 0, 1 ..... n - 1. One may infer the following lemmas from Figs. 2 and 3. 
LEMMA 2.1. In a stable marriage instance J(n), a pair (mi, wj) is a 
blocking pair for a matching M if and only if (mi +1, wj +1) is a blocking pair 
for shift(M). 
Proof Let p~(mi)=wh and let pM(wj)=m~. Then psh~ft(M)(m~+l)= 
wh + 1 and Psh~t(M)(Wj +1) =mk + 1. The following equivalence relations hold: 
(me, wj) is a blocking pair for M 
wj <m~ Wh = p~(mi) and mi <wj mk -= p~(wj) 
Wj+I ~mi+l Wh+l and mi_l_ 1 ~wj+t mk+ 1 
(m~+l, Wj+l) is a blocking pair for shift(M). 
[from the definition of J (n ) ]  
This completes the proof. | 
LEMMA 2.2. In a stable marriage instance J(n), for a matching M and a 
blocking pair (m i, wj) for M, 
shift(binter(M, mi, wj)) = binter(shift(M), mi+ t, wj+ 1). 
Proof For a woman w, we suppose that shift(w) denotes the woman 
Wg+l if w=wg. Let p~(mi)=wh and let pM(wj)=mk. Since (mi, wj), 
(mk, wh)~ binter(M, mi, wj), mr+ l's partner in shift(binter(M, mi, wj)) is 
wj+ 1 if l=i  
wh+l if l=k  
shift(pM (mr)) otherwise, 
for l=0,  ..., n -1 .  On the other hand, from Lemma 2.1, (mi+l, Wj+I) is a 
blocking pair for shift(M) and (mi+l, wh+l), (mk+l, wj+l)eshift(M). 
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Then mt+l'S partner in binter(shift(M), mi+l, Wj+l) is defined as above. 
Hence the equality holds. ] 
THEOREM 2.3. For any size n >>. 4, in a stable marriage instance J(n), 
there is a matching which cannot be transformed to any stable matching by 
b-interchanges. 
Proof We consider a matching 
mo= {(mo, W0), (ml, W1), ..., (m,_3, w,_3), (m, 2, w, 1), (m,_l, wn_2)}. 
From men's preferences, candidates of blocking pairs for M0 are 
(m,_2, w,_2), (m,_2, w,_4), (m,_l, w,_l), (m,_l, w,_3) and (m,_l, Wo). 
See Fig. 2. The pair (mn_ 1, Wo), however, is the only blocking pair for M0 
since women w,_2 and w,_4 prefer their partners in Mo to man mn_2, 
women w,_ 1 and wn_ 3 prefer their partners in M0 to man m,_ a, and Wo 
prefers m~_ 1 to m 0. Let M; be the matching binter(Mo, m, 1, Wo), i.e., 
m~= {(m0, Wn_2) , (ml, wl) .... , (m._3, w~_3), (mn-2, w._ 1), (m._l,  Wo)}. 
From the preferences, there is also only one blocking pair (mn_2, Wn_2) for 
M6. Let M1 denote the matching binter(M'o, mn 2, wn 2), i.e., 
M, = {(too, wn 1), (ml, Wl) . . . . .  (m,_3, w,_3), (m, 2, w, 2), (m,_,, Wo)}. 
The matching M1 is uniquely determined from Mo by two b-interchanges. 
On the other hand, M1 =shift(Mo) (see Figs. 2 and 3). From Lemma 2.1, 
there is only one blocking pair (mo, wl) for M1. Lemma 2.2 implies that 
the matching M', =hinter(M1, too, Wl) identifies with shift(M'o). From the 
above facts, we can show that the sequence Mo, M;, M1, M],... of 
match|rigs i uniquely determined from Mo by b-interchanges and Mn = Mo 
holds. Therefore matchings M i and M[ for i=0, 1 ..... n -1  cannot be 
transformed to any stable matching by b-interchanges. | 
Counter-example when n = 4. The instance J (4)  is described in Fig. 4. 
This instance has 24 matchings and 5 stable matchings. We represent all 
matchings and blocking pairs for each matching in Fig. 5. The divorce 
digraph for J (4)  is drawn in Fig. 6. Matchings M1, Ms, Ml0, M19 and M24 
are stable. There are paths from three matchings M6, M15, M17 to the 
stable matching M1. However, there is no path from any other unstable 
matchings to any one of the five stable matchings. For example, cycle 
{M2, M16 , M22 , M12 , My, M9, M3, M4} of length 8 is obtained in the 
proof of Theorem 2.3 when size n = 4. 
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Men's Preference Lists 
mo w0 w2 Wl w3 
~1 Wl w3 w2 Wo 
r/~2 w2 Wo w3 Wl 
m3 w3 e l  Wo w2 
FIG. 4. 
Women's Preference Lists 
WO 
wi  
W2 
W3 
ml m3 rrto m2 
m2 mo ml  ??2 3 
m 3 m]  m 2 ?-n o 
mo m2 m3 Tt2 1 
Stable marriage instance J(4).  
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too to3 
to2 to° 
to2 ~3 
1,93 too 
1/)3 1/)2 
too to1 
~0 11)3 
Wl too 
Wl 1/33 
W3 W0 
W3 tol 
too tVl 
W0 W2 
tol too 
Wl to2 
W2 W0 
to2 ~/)X 
m3 
w2) 
w~) 
wl) 
w2) 
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w~) 
w~) 
w3) 
wo) 
w2) 
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to3) 
to1) 
wz) 
wo) 
wl) 
too) 
w2) 
toa) 
to2) 
too) 
to1) 
wo) 
(m3, wo) -'-* Mls 
(m~, to3) ~ M~ 
(r.1, ~)  --* M~ 
('~2, ~3) ~ M~ 
(m~, ~1) --+ M1 
( .~, to~) -~ M9 
(too, wo) ---* M3 
(too, ~o) - Ms 
(m3, wa) ---* M7 
(ml, ~2) --' M3 
(ml, to1) - -  M16 
(too, we) ~ M~ 
(m2, w~) --* M~ 
(too, ~o) ~ M6 
(m~, to2) --+ M12 
('no, ~)  --+ My 
(too, ~o) --. M~ 
(too, wl) ---* M12 
(rno, wQ) ----* M4 
Blocking Pairs 
(m3, to3) ~ M3 (m3, too) --* Mls 
(m3, ~3) ~ M1 
(m3, ~3) --* M9 (r-3, ~o) - M12 
(m2, w2) --~ M7 (m2, w3) ~ M14 
(ml, w2) "-* M4 (m2, w2) ---+ M2o 
(-.2, ~2) --* MI 
(r~x, to1) --. Mls (r.2, w2) -- Ms 
(m2,to3) ~ M16 (m3, w3) ~ M13 
(r.~,to,) --* M= (ml,w2) -~ M~3 
(-~o,tol) ~ M~I (r.3, wo) --* M22 
(mo,tol)~ M9 (ml,wl) ~, M21 
FIG. 5. Matchings and blocking pairs in J (4 ) .  
(m3, w3) ~ M15 
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M 16 
M2 M 22 
M 4 M 12 
M 9 
M 17 
M6 (~ i  ~ MI5 
0 
M1 M 8 
FIG. 6. 
0 0 0 
MI0 M 19 M24 
The divorce digraph of J(4). 
3. ALGORITHM FOR FINDING A STABLE MATCHING FROM A MATCHING 
This section provides an algorithm which we call a b-interchange algo- 
rithm, for finding either a directed path from a given matching Mo to some 
stable matching or a cycle in the divorce digraph. A cycle is defined as a 
sequence of 3-tuples (M1, ml, Wa), ..., (M,, m,, w,) consisting of matchings 
M,. and blocking pairs (mi, wl) for Mi such that (M~,ml, wl)= 
(M,, m n, Wn) and Me+ 1 = binter(Mi, me, we) for i = 1 .... , n - 1. If a directed 
cycle C is output by the algorithm, we can construct a matching M from 
C such that bp(M) is a proper subset of bp(Mo), where bp(M) denotes the 
set of all blocking pairs for M. Hence, by iteratively using the algorithm, 
one can always arrive at some stable matching from an arbitrary matching. 
For person q, let bbp~t(q) denote the best person for q among the set 
{Pl (P, q) or (q, p) is a blocking pair for M} if the set is nonempty; 
otherwise bbpM(q)=nil. Then the b-interchange algorithm can be 
expressed as follows. 
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AI.GORrrr~M 3.1 (b-interchange algorithm) 
(input, output): (a matching M, some stable matching or cycle) 
Step 0:M1 :=M, i :=1;  
Step 1: if M~ is stable then output M~ and stop; 
(/7~i, Wi) :~-" a pair in M i such that bbp~,(rh~) ¢ nil or bbpM,(#i) ¢ nil 
Step 2: while bbpM,(rhe) 4= nil or  bbpM~(l~i) 7A nil do begin 
p := rh~ or v~z such that bbpM,(p)¢ nil; 
if p = rh~ then 
m/:= rhi; wi := bbpM,(rhi); 
l~li÷l :=PMi(Wi); 1~i+1 :=Wi 
else {p = wi} 
W i : :  VVi; mi := bbpMi(Wi); 
wi+ l := PM~(mi); rhi+ l :=rhi 
endif; 
{man-oriented b-interchange } 
{marries happily in Mi+ 1} 
{marries unhappily in Mz+ 1 } 
{woman-oriented b-interchange} 
{marries happily in Mi+ 1 } 
{marries unhappily in Mi+ 1} 
if (Mi, mi, w~)= (M s, mj, ws) for some j = 1, ..., i -  1 then 
output the cycle (Mj, ms, ws) .... , (Mi, m/, wi) and stop; 
endif; 
Mi+ l := binter(Mi, mi, wi), i := i+ 1; 
end {while}; 
goto Step 1; 
Given a matching M and a blocking pair (m, w) for M, we say that pairs 
(m, w) and (pM(w), pM(m)) are happy and unhappy in the matching 
binter(M, m, w), respectively, in the sense that unhappy persons were 
deserted by their partners and happy persons get better partners. It is also 
possible that an unhappy person gets a better partner. We call the pair 
defined in Step 1 unhappy for convenience. Informally, the b-interchange 
algorithm may be expressed as a sequence of b-interchanges determined by 
unhappy persons. At any point during the execution of Step 2, either an 
unhappy man rhi or woman 1~ i in a current matching M/determines the 
next blocking pair (nh~, bbpM,(rh~)) or (bbpM,(~), ~). If bbp~,(rh,)~nil 
and bbpM,(~)~nil, then the algorithm has a flexible choice between 
(rh~, bbp~(rh~)) and (bbpM~(~i), ~i); however, there is no problem either 
way. We say that such blocking pairs determined by an unhappy man and 
woman are man-oriented and woman-oriented, respectively, if they exist. If 
such a blocking pair exists then a new matching M~+ 1 is obtained by the 
b-interchange with the blocking pair. We call a b-interchange determined 
by a man-oriented (women-oriented) blocking pair a man-oriented (woman- 
oriented) b-interchange. We note when the matching M~+I is obtained by 
a man-oriented b-interchange, the happy man is satisfied with the matching 
in the sense that there is no blocking pair containing him. Although the 
happy woman has a better partner, she may not be satisfied with the 
matching in the above sense. The same holds when M~÷~ is obtained by a 
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woman-oriented b-interchange. The execution of Step 2 terminates when 
either a cycle is found or bbpMi(rhi)= bbpMi(#~)= nil. 
We first prove that Step 2 of the b-interchange algorithm reduces the 
number of blocking pairs if it find no cycle in the divorce digraph. Let Ms 
be a matching just before the execution of the while statement in Step 2 
and let M~ be a matching just after the execution. For a matching Mk 
(k = s, ..., t) at any point during the execution, the following lemma holds. 
LEMMA 3.1. Let (m, w) be a pair satisfying at least one of the following 
conditions: 
(1) m or w is unhappy, 
(2) (m, w) is not a blocking pair, i.e., pM~(m) ~m W or pMk(W) ~w m 
for M~. 
Then for any k=s  + 1 ..... t, (m, w) satisfies (1) or (2)for Mk. 
Proof We will prove the assertion by induction on k. Assume that con- 
dition (1) holds for M~. If (m, w) is an unhappy pair in Mk then either m 
or w is clearly unhappy in Mk +1. Since men and women are symmetric, we 
consider the case when m is unhappy and w is not unhappy in Mk. If Mk + 1 
is obtained by the woman-oriented b-interchange then m is also unhappy 
in Mk+l. So we suppose that Mk+~ is obtained by the man-oriented 
b-interchange determined by man m, below. If (m, w) is a blocking pair for 
Mk, then m has the partner bbpM~(m) in Mk+l with bbpMk(m)<~m w, and 
hence, condition (2) holds for Mk+ 1. Suppose that (m, w) is not a blocking 
pair for Mk, i.e., conditions (1) and (2) hold for Mk. IfpMk(m) ~<m W then 
m has the partner bbpMk(m) in Mk+l with bbpMk(m)<mPMk(m)<~mW; 
otherwise pMk+l(w)=pMk(W)<~wm since Mk+l is obtained by the man- 
oriented b-interchange and since (m, w) does not block Mk. Therefore 
condition (2) holds for Mk+a. 
To complete the proof we consider the case when condition (2) holds 
for Mk but (1) does not. Without loss of generality, we suppose that 
pMk(m)<~m W. We can consider three possibilities: m becomes unhappy 
in Mk + 1, m becomes happy in M k +~ and the remaining case. In the first 
case, condition (1) holds for Mk+l. The second case implies that 
PMk+I(m) <m PMk(m) ~m W, i.e., condition (2). In the third case, pMk+~(m) = 
PMk(m) <<-m W holds. | 
L~MMA 3.2. I f  no cycle is found in Step 2 then the set bp(Mt ) is a proper 
subset of bp(Ms), i.e., bp(Mt) = bp(Ms). 
Proof From Lemma 3.1, if (m, w) is not a blocking pair for Ms, then 
at least one of m or w is unhappy in M,, or (m, w) is not a blocking pair 
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for Mr. If m or w is unhappy in Mt then (m, w) does not block Mt since 
bbpM,(rht) = bbpM,(~t) = nil. Then bp(mt) c_ bp(ms) holds. 
Let (ms, Ws) be the initial blocking pair for Ms. Then either m s or w, is 
unhappy in M, (we recall that (rhs, #~) is an unhappy pair in M~). In par- 
ticular, from Lemma 3.1 and the fact that bbpM,(~t)= bbp:vI,(#t) =nil, as 
above, (m~, ws) in bp(M~) does not block Mr. Hence bp(Mt) c bp(Ms). | 
Lemma 3.2 says that the set of blocking pairs shrinks after Step 2 when 
no cycle is found. 
We next consider the case when the b-interchange algorithm outputs a 
cycle C. In the rest of this section, we suppose that the cycle is defined as 
C= {(Mr, mr, w,) .... , (mn-1, mn 1, Wn 1), (M~, mn, w,)}. 
We will show that one can obtain a matching M such that bp(M) ~ bp(Ms) 
by using the cycle C. Since men and women are symmetric, we will only 
prove assertions for men in the lemmas below. 
Let Cm and Cw denote the sets of men and women whose partners are 
interchanged uring the cycle C, respectively. Then the following lemma 
holds. 
LEMMA 3.3. I f  the b-interchange algorithm outputs a cycle C, then 
Cm={mt,... ,m~ 1} and Cw={Wz,...,wn_l}. 
Proof. Obviously, C m DD_ {iTl l . . . . .  m~ 1}' Assume on the contrary that 
there exists a man me Cm\{mt, ..., mn_l}. Then, m becomes unhappy at 
some point during C. After this point, there is no man-oriented b-inter- 
change by m, because m ¢ {mr ..... mn_ 1 }, which means that after this point 
the only unhappy man is m. So if any man (¢m)  changes his partner, 
he obtains a new partner whom he prefers to his old one. Because 
cycling means not only M r = Mn but also that the unhappy couple in the 
matching is the same, no cycle can occur under the assumption. Hence 
Cm={m~,...,m~ 1}. | 
For each man m E C,~, let bbpc(m) denote the best woman for m among 
the set of women with whom m causes b-interchanges during the cycle C, 
i.e., among the set {wi](m, wi) = (mi, wi), i = l, .... n - 1 }. From Lemma 3.3, 
bbpc(m) is well-defined. We define bbpc(w) for each woman we Cw in the 
same way. 
LEMMA 3.4. I f  man me C m has a partner in some matching M i 
( i=l  ..... n--1) whom he prefers to bbpc(m ) then m is unhappy in M i. The 
same also holds for women in Cw. 
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Proof Man m changes his partner if and only if he becomes either 
happy or unhappy. From the definition of bbpc(m), if he becomes happy 
then his partner is bbpc(m) or below. Thus the assertion holds. | 
LEMMA 3.5. For ml, mzE C m and wl, w~Cw, 
ml ~ m2 ~ bbp c(ml) ~ bbpc(m2), 
W 1 ~ W 2 ::~ bbpc(Wl) ¢ bbpc(w2). 
Proof Assume on the contrary that there exist two men ml, m2~ Cm 
with bbpc(ml)= bbpc(m2)= w. In addition, we suppose the following: 
(1) Let the cycle C consist of matchings M 1 ..... Mk; 
(2) ml <w m2 (w likes ml better than m2); 
(3) j=min{i~[1, k -1 ] fM i  is obtained by a b-interchange with 
(mz, w)}; 
(4) (ml, w)~M1 and (ml, w)¢Mifor i=2 , . . . , j -1 .  
From assumption (4), w is happy or unhappy in M2. Since bbpc(ma)= w, 
w must marry happily. Then w has a partner in M2 whom she prefers to 
m~ and hence to m2 also from assumption (2). Since w and m 2 marry hap- 
pily in Mj, she must be unhappy in some matching M~ (i= 3 ..... j -  1). Let 
h be the maximum in {3 .... , j - l}  such that wis unhappy in Mh. Since 
(m~, w)¢Mh, m~ is not unhappy in Mh. From Lemma 3.4, W<ml P~ch(ml) 
holds. Then w has a partner in Mh+l whom she prefers to ml since 
Mh+ ~ is initiated by w from the maximality of h. From the definitions 
of h and j, w prefers her partner in Mj, namely m2, to m~. This is a 
contradiction. |
For a cycle C found by the the b-interchange algorithm, let M E be the 
set of man-woman pairs defined by 
(m, bbpc(m)) ~ M'~ if m ~ Cm 
(m, pM(m))~M'~ if m¢Cmfor MEC. 
The set M~ of man-woman pairs can be defined similarly. Lemmas 3.3 and 
3.5 guarantee that each of the sets M E and M~ form a matching. 
Matchings M E and M~ may not be obtained from the initial matching M s 
by a sequence of b-interchanges. By considering M E or M c, we can reduce 
the set of blocking pairs. We will prove that bp(M"~), bp(M~)= bp(Ms), 
below. 
LEMMA 3.6. For any me Cm, let Mi+l be a matching obtained by a 
b-interchange d termined by (m, bbp c(m )). Then w = bbp c(m ) is unhappy in 
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Me, so (m, w) is a woman-oriented blocking pair. Similarly, for any ~ ~ Cw, 
(bbpc(#), ~) is a man-oriented blocking pair for Mj if Mj+l is obtained by 
a b-interchange with (bbpc(#), ~). 
Proof First we show that if w is not unhappy in a matching then her 
partner in the matching is either m or a man whom she prefers to m. 
Assume that w is unhappy in a matching Mk and marries happily in Mk+l. 
If m is also unhappy in Mk, then w has a partner in Mk+l whom she 
prefers to m. Suppose that m is not unhappy in the matching Mk. From 
Lemma 3.4, m prefers w=bbpc(m) to pMk(m). Then w's partner in Mk+l 
is either m or a man whom she prefers to m. After k + 1, whenever w is not 
unhappy, her partner is either m or a man whom she prefers to m. 
From the above fact, w must be unhappy in M~ because otherwise (m, w) 
does not block M~. I 
We remark, from the proof of Lemma 3.6, that m~ C m is the worst 
partner for bbpc(m) among the set {mil(mi, bbpc(m)) is a man- or 
woman-oriented blocking pair during the cycle C} and that w e Cw is the 
worst for bbpc(w). 
LEMMA 3.7. Suppose that the b-interchange algorithm outputs a cycle C. 
Then, if (m, w) is a blocking pair for M E then m ¢Cm and w ¢ Cw. The same 
is true for M~. 
Proof Assume on the contrary that w~ Cw holds. Let rh be the man 
such that bbpc(r~)= w. Since (m, w) blocks ME, m Cr~ holds. We suppose 
that a matching Mi+l is obtained from Mi by a b-interchange determined 
by (r~, w) during the cycle C. Then rh <w PM~(W) • If m was unhappy in Mi 
then w would prefer r~ to m, i.e., (m, w) could not be a blocking pair for 
ME, because w is unhappy in M~ from Lemma 3.6. Assume that m is not 
unhappy in M~. If me Cm then pM,(m) equals m's partner in M E and 
W<mPM~(m ). If m~C m then by Lemma3.4 (which applies because 
m ~ Cm), pm~(m) is bbpc(m) or below, and hence, w <m pM,(m) since (m, w) 
blocks M E. Hence (re, w) is a blocking pair for Mi because 
m <w rh <w PM,(W) • But then m should have been selected over rh by w, 
a contradiction. Thus w q~ Cw holds. 
Assume on the contrary that m~ C~ holds. From the above proof, 
w ¢ Cw holds. Let M~+I be a matching such that m is happy in M~+I and 
unhappy in M~. Then bbpc(m) <<, m PM~+I(m) <m pM~(m). Since (m, w) is a 
blocking pair for M'~, w <m bbpc(m). On the other hand, m <w PM~(w) = 
pM,~(W) because w¢Cw. Then (m,w) blocks Mi. But m should have 
selected w or a woman whom he prefers to w as a partner in Mi+l. This 
is a contradiction. 
Hence m (~ C m and w ¢ Cw. | 
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Lemma 3.7 immediately implies that bp(M'~), bp(M~) c bp(M) for any 
matching M during the cycle C. One can prove a stronger esult from 
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.7. 
LEMMA 3.8. I f  the b-interchange outputs a cycle C, then 
bp(M'~), bp(M~) c bp(Ms), 
where M~ is a matching just before the execution of Step 2. 
Proof Let M be a matching during the cycle C and let (m, w) be a 
pair not blocking Ms. By Lemma 3.1, m or w is unhappy in M, or (m, w) 
is not a blocking pair for M. In the first case, m ~ C m or w e C w. From 
Lemma 3.7, (m, w) is not a blocking pair for M E. If m ¢ Cm, w ¢ Cw, and 
(m, w) does not block M then (m, w) is not a blocking pair for M E since 
pM(m) = pM,~(m) and pM(w) = pM~(w). Then bp(m'~) ~_ bp(ms). 
Let (m,, ws) be the initial blocking pair for Ms. That is, ms or ws is 
unhappy in M~. We can show that (ms, Ws)(~ bp(M~) by using Lemmas 3.1 
and 3.7, as above. Hence bp(M'~) is a proper subset of bp(Ms). | 
From Lemmas3.2 and 3.8, one can obtain a matching M with 
bp(M) c bp(M~) when the execution of Step 2 terminates. Therefore, by 
iteratively using the b-interchange algorithm, one can always arrive at 
some stable matching from an arbitrary matching. 
THEOREM 3.9. Combining the b-interchange algorithm with transforma- 
tions to M'~ and M~, we can obtain some stable matching from an arbitrary 
matching. 
EXAMPLE. We apply the b-interchange algorithm to the instance J (4)  
in Fig. 4. Let M2 = {(mo, Wo), (ml, wl), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)} be an input 
matching and let (m3, Wo) be the initial blocking pair. Then the algorithm 
outputs a cycle 
C = { (M2, m3, Wo), (M16, m2, w2), (M22, mo, wl), (ma2, m3, w3), 
(m7, m l, w2), (M9, too, Wo), (M3, m2, w3), (m4, ml, wl), (M2, m3, Wo)}. 
Any matching in this cycle cannot be transformed to any one of the five 
stable matchings (see Fig. 6). However, from the cycle C, one can construct 
two matcbings 
M E = {(mo, Wo), (ml, wl), (m2, w2), (m3, W3)} 
M~= {(mo, wl), (ma, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, Wo)}. 
From Fig. 5, these are stable. 
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Remarks. It is not certain whether our algorithm for transforming a 
given matching to some stable matching terminates in polynomial time. 
From Lemma3.3, the length k -1  of a cycle C=(Ml ,ml ,w l ) , . . . ,  
(Mk, ink, wk) is at least 2 x [Cml = 2 x ICwh. However, there is an indication 
that the length equals 2 x [C~l by our experiments for small stable 
marriage instances. 
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